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1. Introduction
It is widely believed that exchange rate fluctuations are crucial in firms’ export
performance. A considerable number of papers document the impact of exchange
rate fluctuations on export prices and volumes (Cushman, 1983; Dell, 1999; Mc
Kenzie, 1999; Forbes, 2002; Marquez and Schindler, 2007; Berman et al., 2012; Li
et al., 2015; Chen and Juvenal , 2016). Indeed, empirical research typically finds a
small effect of exchange rate movements on the prices of international traded goods,
which is one of the central puzzles in international macroeconomics. For example,
the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT thereafter) is 92% for French exporters
(Berman et al., 2012), 96% for Chinese exporters (Li et al., 2015), 79% for Belgian
exporters (Amiti et al., 2014), and 77% for Brazilian exporters (Chatterjee et al.,
2013).
The availability of firm-level data enables researchers to explore firm-level het-
erogeneous ERPT, which offers micro-foundations for the high ERPT. Firms that
are more productive and export high-quality products usually exhibit a higher
ERPT (e.g. Berman et al., 2012; Li et al., 2015; Chen and Juvenal , 2016; Berni-
ni and Tomasi, 2015). This is mainly through the channel of local distribution
cost. Meanwhile, a seminal paper by Amiti et al. (2014) using Belgian data finds
that exporters with high exporting market shares tend to have a lower ERPT.
This is because exporters with higher market shares charge higher markups and
hence can absorb more exchange rate fluctuations, which leads to a lower ERPT.
This is through the competition channel documented by Atkeson and Burstein
(2008). However, different markets may be interconnected through supply or de-
mand spillovers (e.g. Whinston, 1990; Erdem, 1998; Gavazza , 2011; Gallant et
al., 2016). Whinston (1990) shows that a firm can leverage its market power in
one market to affect the competition result in another market. Erdem (1998) and
Gavazza (2011) find that consumers’ loyalty to particular brands makes umbrella
branding strategy profitable for firms that serve several different markets (demand
spillovers). In contrast, Gallant et al. (2016) emphasize the learning effect through
which a firm can decrease its marginal cost in a product market after serving other
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similar product markets (supply spillovers). As such, when firms export to multi-
ple destinations, the firm-level ERPT in any particular destination relies not only
on the competition in this market, but also on the competition in other markets.
This is because exporters can make use of their experience in other markets to
affect the competition in a particular market.
In this paper, we attempt to investigate how cross-market competition, which
is referred to as product market rivalry or market rivalry in Bloom et al. (2013),
affects firm-level ERPT. Product market rivalry is defined as the competition a
firm faces in all markets it serves.1 Bloom et al. (e.g. 2013) attributes cross-market
competition to information leakage.2 A firm can leverage its market power from
one destination to another (e.g Whinston, 1990). For instance, a representative
firm might face severe competition in a particular market if its competitors can
make use of the reputation they built in other markets to affect the competition in
this market; or the firm leaked information in some markets, which its competitors
can use to affect the degree of competition in the particular market. As such, on the
one hand, a firm faces a lower degree of market rivalry in a particular market if it
has higher market shares in each export destination;3 on the other hand, if the firm
“exposes” more to competitors in each export export destinations, it would face a
fiercer competition in the particular market.4 We expect that a higher degree of
market rivalry results in a higher ERPT, since firm-level markups are lower when
facing a fiercer competition, which prevents firms from absorbing exchange rate
fluctuations and pricing less to markets.
Using a dataset that contains comprehensive Chinese exporters during the
2000-2007 period, we empirically uncover the impact of market rivalry on firm-level
ERPT. The results indicate that although firms increase export price in response
1The measure of market rivalry will be introduced in detail in the data description parts.
2The leaked information in one market could affect competition in another market.
3 In this case, the representative firm is not afraid of its competitors to leverage their reputa-
tion from other markets, as it has a higher market share in every market and hence, can leverage
its own reputation to the particular market.
4Firm i’s degree of exposure to firm j in market m is defined as exportim∑′
m exportim′
exportjm∑′
m exportjm′
. This
measure is proposed by Bloom et al. (2013) and measures bilateral firm-level market proximity.
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to a domestic currency depreciation, a higher degree of market rivalry weakens the
price-increasing incentive. This implies that firms which face a higher degree of
market rivalry tend to absorb less exchange rate fluctuations and hence exhibit a
higher level of ERPT. Furthermore, we divide the sample into different subsamples
to analyze the mechanisms through which market rivalry affects firm-level ERPT.
Results demonstrate that (1) market rivalry has a trivial effect on the ERPT of
firms that export homogeneous product, while the effect is statistically significant
for firms exporting heterogeneous products; (2) market rivalry increases the ERPT
of firms that export consumption goods, but it has no effect on firms that export
non-consumption goods; (3) Market rivalry is more likely to affect firm-level export
price in developed countries while no significant effect has been found on firm-level
export price in developing countries.
Our work is closely related to the literature that studies the connection be-
tween exchange rate fluctuations and firm-level export performance (Atkeson and
Burstein, 2008; Amiti et al., 2014; Berman et al., 2012; Bergsten, 2010; Chen and
Juvenal , 2016; Campa and Goldberg, 2005; Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008; Knetter,
1993; Giri, 2012), particularly, the recent and growing literature that explores the
heterogeneous impact of exchange rate fluctuations on firm-level pricing-to-market
strategy. Berman et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2015), for instance, respectively doc-
ument that, in France and China, more productive firms adjust their export price
more in response to exchange rate fluctuations; Chen and Juvenal (2016) find
that French firms that export high-quality wines tend to absorb more exchange
rate fluctuations and have a lower level of ERPT. Amiti et al. (2014) emphasize the
important role played by firm-level import intensity and market shares in shaping
firm-level ERPT.
Our study contributes to the ERPT literature by exploring how market rivalry
affects exporters’ pricing-to-market strategy. In contrast to the seminal paper of
Amiti et al. (2014), in which firm-level ERPT to a particular market is only related
to the competition (market share) within this market, we underscore the influence
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of cross-market competition spillovers on firm-level ERPT.5 Our findings indicate
that firm-level pricing-to-market strategy is influenced by the degree of market
rivalry across all markets that the firm serves. In addition, by dividing the sample
into different subsamples, we identify the source of cross-market spillovers that
affect firm-level pricing-to-market strategy.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: in section 2 we characterize the
data we use, section 3 introduces the construction of our main empirical variables,
section 4 presents the results, and finally section 5 concludes.
2. Data
Our empirical exercises use indicators constructed mainly from three datasets:
(1). Customs dataset that contains comprehensive Chinese Exporters; (2). An-
nual Surveys of Industrial Production dataset that provides firm-level production
information; (3). macro-level exchange rate dataset from Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU hereafter).
2.1. Customs transaction level trade data
The Chinese Customs trade dataset provides trade information of all Chinese firms’
during 2000-2007. These data are collected by the Chinese General Administration
of Customs (GAC). The GAC dataset report firm-product-destination-level trade
information at the monthly frequency, i.e., export trade values (in U.S. dollars),
and trade volumes at HS 8-digit product category for firms in each transaction,
etc. In the empirical analysis, we follow other researchers (e.g. Manova and Zhang,
2012; Tang and Zhang, 2012) to aggregate the customs data at the annual level.
This is to make the data frequency consistent with that of the Annual Surveys.
The annual firm-product-level export price in destination country j is constructed
5Our results show that after controlling for firm-level market share (competition) in a market,
the competition that firms face in other markets still significantly affect these firms’ ERPT.
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as the ratio of export values to export volumes:
pikjt =
Export V alueikjt
Export V olumeikjt
where pikjt denotes firm i’s export price of product k in market k at t. Making
use of nominal exchange rate information between RMB and U.S. dollar ( bilateral
nominal exchange rate information is available in the EIU data base, which will be
introduced below), we transfer the export price in U.S. dollar to Chinese yuan.6
2.2. Annual surveys data
Annual surveys of manufacturing firms collected and maintained by China’s Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This dataset covers all state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and non-SOEs with annual sales of more than RMB 5 million (which is
equivalent to around $770, 000 according to the current exchange rate). Those
surveys contain financial information on individual firms such as value-added la-
bor input, investment, and intermediate inputs. We noticed that a substantial
portion of the samples are noisy and hence follow the criteria proposed by Brandt
et al. (2012) and Feenstra et al. (2014) to clean the data. Specifically, we delete
observations in which key variables are missing and in which the firm reports fewer
than 8 employees. Furthermore, we also drop observations with total assets less
than liquid assets, or total fixed assets or net value of the fixed assets. The filtered
number of observations falls by about 30 percent each year, and the total number
of firms ranges from 83, 868 in 2000 to 294, 398 in 2007.
In using firm-level trade and production information, a key step is to match
the dataset of annual surveys with the customs dataset. Following Upward et al.
(2013), we match the two datasets using firm name and established year. The
reason is that firm name is less likely to be missing or to change during the rela-
tively short time period (2000-2007), while the other information may change (e.g.
6 The export values are recoded in U.S. dollars, and hence, the export price that is calculated
as the ratio of export value to export volume is in U.S. dollars.
6
Upward et al., 2013). Table 1 reports the matching results. The results show that
our matched sample, on average, accounts for 43.2% of export firms in the annual
surveys dataset and 21.17% of export firms in the customs data.
[Table 1 is to be here]
2.3. Exchange rate data
The exchange rate is the key variable in this paper, which we download from the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) database,7 which provides bilateral nominal
exchange rates between US dollars and currencies in more than 200 countries since
1980. These bilateral nominal exchange rates enable us to construct the bilateral
nominal exchange rates between China and its trading partners. We drop countries
whose bilateral nominal exchange rates are missing during 2000-2007 period, and
there remains 185 countries that report bilateral nominal exchange rates to US
dollars in the whole sample period. The EIU database also provides other country-
level or region-level information, i.e., population, GDP, and CPI. We match the
exchange rate information with our previous matched sample using country codes
available in both datasets. This match process further decreases our sample size.
Detailed matching results are reported in Panel C of Table 2:
[Table 2 is to be here]
The matching results in Table 2 indicate that, after combining the exchange
rate information with the previous matched sample, the number of exporting des-
tinations falls from 237 to 175. In contrast, the number of export firms, export
varieties, and values demonstrate quite small changes. This implies that those
dropped countries are not major trading partners of Chinese firms.
Using bilateral nominal exchange rates and consumer price index (CPI) in each
country, we construct the bilateral real exchange rate. We use ejt and Ejt to denote
7EIU country data are available at: https://eiu.bvdep.com/version-2017213/cgi/template.dll.
7
the real and nominal exchange rate between China and the foreign country j in
time t, respectively. Ejt is defined as the price of foreign currency in terms of
Chinese yuan, and hence, an increase in Ejt or ejt indicates a nominal or real
depreciation in Chinese yuan. The bilateral real exchange rate is constructed as:
ejt =
Ejt × CPIjt
CPICt
(1)
where, CPICt and CPIjt denote the CPI in China and foreign country j in year
t, respectively.
The RMB was pegged to the U.S. dollar before 2005, and hence the RM-
B/dollar nominal exchange rate was quite stable before 2005. However, we observe
substantial variation in the real exchange rate of the Chinese yuan across market-
s. In Figure 1, we depict the real and nominal exchange rate of Chinese yuan
against the U.S. dollar and the Euro. The figure shows a substantial variation of
RMB (especially real exchange rate) against its trading partners. In particular,
during the sample period, the real exchange rate of RMB appreciates against the
U.S. Dollar, but depreciates in Euros. In addition, we observe striking growth
in Chinese exports to the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore, the nominal and real
exchange rate of Chinese yuan relative to other Asian currency also exhibit sub-
stantial volatility (see Figure 2). Figure 2 indicates that Chinese yuan appreciates
against Japan Yen, Taiwan dollar, and appreciate relative to the Korean won and
Philippine peso.
[Figure 1 is to be here]
[Figure 2 is to be here]
3. Market Rivalry
In this section, we describe the way of constructing market rivalry and offer the
intuition behind the construction. To formalize, consider an economy with M
firms. Each firm i ∈ (1,M) has a fixed number of sales agents, ni. These sales
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agents are allocated across market j ∈ (1, J), and we take the allocation of sales
agent, nij, across markets as exogenous with
∑
j nij = ni. Similar to Bloom et
al. (2013), we assume that, when a sales agent in market j from firm i is exposed
to other sales agents in the same market, with probability ω > 0 the encounter
generates a leakage of information for firm i. Information leakage may take place
when two sales agents meet in a coffee shop or a sales agent moves from one firm
to another. The leaked information might reveal firm i′s pricing strategy, product
quality choice, market expansion plan, etc. Competitors of firm i take advantage
of the information to compete with firm i in all markets which firm i serves.8
Therefore, if sales agents from firm i gain more exposure to other sales agents in a
particular market j, information leakage is more likely to take place in market j,
which will affect firm i’s operation in all other markets. A firm’s exposure degree
is also referred to as product market rivalry or product market proximity (Bloom
et al., 2013). A higher degree of exposure implies a higher degree of market rivalry
to which a representative firm faces.
We define the vector Fi = (Fi1, ...FiJ), where Fij =
nij
ni
, as the distribution of
firm i′s sale agents across different markets (export destinations). The measure
of product market proximity (market rivalry) between firms i and k is SICik =
FiFkni, and the product spillover “pool” for firm i is
Rivalryi = ω
∑
i 6=k
SICiknk (2)
where the measure of market rivalry, Rivalryi, is the weighted sum of the number
of sale agents in other firms, where the weights are the “exposure” measure of
proximity. The market rivalry measure in equation (2) relies on two components:
the competition from any firm k, SICik, and the size of the competitors, which is
measured by the number of sale agents, nk. On the one hand, according to the
rearangement inequality, SICik reaches the maximum when the vectors Fi and Fk
8Note that, if firm i’s information is leaked in market j, competitors make use of the infor-
mation to compete with firm i not only in market j but also all other markets in which firm i
operates.
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have the same ranking. i.e., Fi1 > Fi2... > FiJ when Fk1 > Fk2 > ... > FkJ . On
the other hand, the market rivalry measure is increasing in nk. The intuition is
straightforward: when firm i and firm k have similar sale skewness across markets,
the competition between the two firms is fiercer, which leads to a larger SICik. As
such, the degree of market rivalry from firm k is larger. Meanwhile, when firm k
is more powerful, measured by the total number of firm k’s sale agents, it brings
an even larger threat to firm i.9
In response to the domestic currency depreciation relative to foreign country
j, a firm that faces a higher degree of market rivalry is expected to increase their
export price to a lesser degree, since the high degree of market rivalry prevents this
firm from charging a high markup. As a result, firms that face a higher degree of
market rivalry tend to absorb less exchange rate fluctuations. This idea is similar
to the work of Amiti et al. (2014): firm-level ERPT to a particular country j
is decreasing in the firm’s market share (power) in country j, but in our study,
market power (advantage) in country j is determined by the market rivalry the
firm faces in all markets it serves.
With the matched sample, we follow Bloom et al. (2013) and Jaffe (1986) to
construct the measure of market rivalry as follows. First, we compute firm-product-
year level Exportikt, which denotes firm i’s aggregate export volume of produc-
t k (at HS6 level) in year t, and firm-product-destination-year level Exportikjt,
which denotes the export volume of product k to destination j by firm i. Sec-
ond, we compute the market skewness vector Sik = (Sik1, Sik2, ..., SikJ), where
Sikj =
1
T
∑T
t=1
Exportikjt
Exportikt
.10 Sikj is the average export share of product k (over year)
that is exported by firm i in market j, and the vector Sik contains the export share
of product k in different markets; third, the measure of rivalry between firm i and
9Larger firms are usually better at making use of the leaked information relative to small
firms and making them harder to compete with.
10Sik and Sikj are counterparts of Fi and Fij , respectively.
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m in product k can be defined as:
SICimk =
SikS
′
mk
(SikS ′ik)
1
2 (SmkS ′mk)
1
2
(3)
Finally, market rivalry is a weighted average of SICimk.
Rivalryit =
∑
m6=i
SICimk
Exportmkt
Exportikt
(4)
The degree of market rivalry varies significantly across industries. Table 3
reports export sectors that face the highest and lowest degree of market rivalry,
respectively. Figures in Table 3 imply that firms that export footwear or textile
related products face the highest degree of competition, while firms producing
metallic and chemical materials experience trivial competition. Meanwhile, we al-
so depict the trend of average market rivalry faced by Chinese exporters over time
in Figure 3. We can observe a clear increasing trend of the market rivalry mea-
sure during 2000-2007. The variation of market rivalry measures across industries
and over time provides identification for our empirical exercise. Furthermore, the
increasing trend of the market rivalry measure faced by Chinese exporters offer
an alternative interpretation for the high ERPT of Chinese export firms during
the sample period: The increasing competition prevents exporters from charging
a high markup, and hence, they only absorb a very small portion of exchange rate
fluctuations.11
[Table 3 is to be here]
[Figure 3 is to be here]
Before we move to the empirical estimation, several features of the market rival-
ry measure are worth addressing here. First, Bloom et al. (2013) construct the
11Li et al. (2015) find an almost complete ERPT of Chinese exporters during the same period,
which is 96%.
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measure of market rivalry at the firm level. i.e., they use the firm-level share of
sales for different product k, Si = (Si1, ...Sik), to construct the measure of rivalry
between any two firms. In contrast, our measure of market rivalry is at the firm-
product level. Therefore, while Bloom et al. (2013) emphasize rivalry spillovers
across different products, we highlight the rivalry spillovers for the same product
across different destinations. Second, the measure of market rivalry defined in
equation (4) is comparable with market share. Consider firms that export to a
single country, Sik = (Sik1), which implies SICimk = 1. Following equation (4),
Rivalryit =
∑
m6=i
Exportmkt
Exportikt
, which is an inverse of the market share for firm i in
sector k. Amiti et al. (2014) show that firms with a larger market share tend to
absorb more exchange rate fluctuations, and exhibit a smaller ERPT. We expect
that firms that face a high degree of market rivalry (low market share) absorb less
exchange rate fluctuations, and exhibit a larger ERPT.
4. Estimation and Results
In this section, we empirically estimate the impact of firms faced market rivalry
on the firm-level ERPT. Similar to the specification in the ERPT literature (e.g.
Berman et al., 2012; Chen and Juvenal , 2016; Amiti et al., 2014), we add an
interaction term of real exchange rate and the market rivalry measure in the export
price regression as follows:
lnpikjt = α+β1lnRERjt+β2lnRERjt×lnRivalryikt+β3lnRivalryikt+lnGDPjt+γXit+δkjt+εikjt
(5)
where RERjt denotes the bilateral exchange rate between China and destination
country j. Rivalryikt captures the degree of market rivalry faced by firm i in
product market k. lnGDPjt is the log GDP of country j in year t. Xit contains a
series of firm-level characteristics which affect a firm’s export price, i.e., firm-level
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TFP, average wage.12 δkjt = δkj + δt, which controls for product-country fixed
effects and year fixed effects. Results are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 is to be here]
Results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 are obtained by adding more controls.
Results in column (4) first indicates that a 10% domestic currency depreciation
leads to a 0.6% export price increase, which implies an almost complete ERPT at
94%. This result is comparable with Li et al. (2015); second, the coefficient on
the interaction term lnRER × lnRivalry is negative and statistically significant.
This implies that firms facing a higher degree of market rivalry tend to increase
their export price less in response to a domestic depreciation. Specifically, at the
80th percentile of the market rivalry measure (Rivalryit=5.986), the price increase
is 0.036% less in response to a 10% domestic currency depreciation. Although
this figure is small, it is statistically significant, which confirms the existence of
competition spillovers across different markets.
4.1. Heterogeneous Impact of Market Rivalry on Different
Firms
We further study the mechanism through which market rivalry affects firm-level
export price. Specifically, we are interested in understanding the heterogenous
impact of market rivalry on different exporters.
First, we follow the classification of Broad Economic Category (BEC hereafter)
to divide all products into consumption goods and non-consumption goods; sec-
ond, based on the substitution of elasticity measured by Broda et al. (2006), we
classify products into heterogeneous product categories and homogeneous produc-
t category;13 and third, we study firm-level ERPT in developed and developing
12Firm-level TFP is estimated using the LP method, while a firm’s average wage is computed
as the total wage paid divided by the total number of employees.
13Broda et al. (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution at HS 3-digit product level for
73 countries, and most countries report close to 200 HS 3-digit sectors. We make use of their
13
countries, respectively.14 All results are reported in Table 5.
[Table 5 is to be here]
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 5 show the results for consumption and non-consumption
products, respectively. We find first that, although firms that export consumption
and non-consumption products increase the export price in response to a depreci-
ation, the firms exporting consumption products increase their export price more
relative to nonconsumption product exporters (0.0906 against 0.0182). Second,
market rivalry only affects the ERPT of firms that export consumption prod-
ucts, but the effect on non-consumption products exporters is only statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level. Note that non-consumption products are
usually intermediate inputs. One possible explanation is that non-consumption
product importers are less sensitive to price changes, since these importers re-
quire stable intermediates import to stabilize their production, which allows non-
consumption exporters to pass more exchange rate fluctuations to these importers
(lower coefficient of lnERE). As such, the export-import relationship between
non-consumption exporters and importers is more stable and less likely to break
down due to the competition from other intermediate inputs suppliers. Therefore,
the firm-level ERPT for firms that export non-consumption products is trivial-
ly affected by the market rivalry they faced. In contrast, consumption product
importers may be more sensitive to price and more easily to switch their trade
partners. As such, market rivalry has a more significant effect on the pricing
strategy of consumption products exporters.
Columns (3)-(4) report the results for homogeneous and heterogeneous prod-
ucts, respectively. While firms that export homogeneous and heterogeneous prod-
ucts exhibit similar degree of ERPT (similar coefficients of lnERE), market rivalry
only affects the ERPT of firms that export heterogeneous products. In other word-
elasticity of substitution estimates in China to divide products into high and low elasticity of
substitution categories.
14World bank defines developed countries as countries with per-capita GNIs above $9, 760 in
2007 using the Atlas conversation factor, and counties whose GNIs below $9, 760 as developing
countries.
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s, in response to depreciation, homogeneous and heterogeneous product exporters
increase their export price, but market rivalry diminishes the price increase for
heterogeneous product exporters only. One interpretation is that a possible way
market rivalry affect firms’ behavior is through information leakage. The leaked
information weakens a firm’s market power and changes its pricing-to-market s-
trategy (discussed in section 3). For homogeneous product exporters, the high
degree of product similarity weakens the usefulness of leaked information, i.e., the
similar product quality and price provide limited help for competitors. Therefore,
market rivalry has statistically insignificant effect on the ERPT of homogeneous
exporters.
Columns (5)-(6) show the results for firms that export to developed countries
and developing countries, respectively. First, the results indicate a complete ERP-
T to developing countries, and an incomplete ERPT to developed country, 84.8%
(1 − 25.2%). Second, market rivalry affects firm-level ERPT to developed coun-
tries, while it has a trivial and statistically insignificant influence on the ERPT
to developing countries. Intuitively, export competition in developed countries
is more intensified (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Manova and Zhang, 2012), and
hence firms that export to developed countries are larger and more productive.
Li et al. (2015) and Berman et al. (2012) document that more productive firms
tend to absorb more exchange rate fluctuations. This leads to a lower ERPT in
developed countries than that in developing countries. Following the same logic,
competitors in developed countries are stronger and better at of making use of
leaked information or reputation spillovers. As a result, the representative firm
is more concerned about the degree of market rivalry it faces when it exports to
developed countries. As such, market rivalry affects firm-level ERPT to developed
countries.
In sum, our results reveal that market rivalry, through cross markets spillovers,
affects firms that export consumption products, or heterogeneous products and to
developed countries. This implies that leaked information or cross-market repu-
tation spillovers are much more useful for competitors in consumption product or
heterogeneous product sectors , and competitors in developed countries are better
15
at making use of leaked information or cross-markets reputation spillovers.
4.2. Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness checks to verify our baseline
results in Table 3. First, following Berman et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2015), we
construct different bins of the market rivalry measures based on its percentile,15
with the bottom bins as the reference group. These bins are used as alternative
market rivalry measure and interact with the real exchange rate.16 The results are
reported in Table 6.
[Table 6 is to be here]
In columns (1)-(2), columns (3)-(4), and column (5)-(6), we report the coeffi-
cients for the interaction terms between lnRER and the top 50%, top 25%, and
top 10% market rivalry group. All results confirm that firms that face a higher
degree of market rivalry are less responsive to exchange rate fluctuations, which
leads to a higher ERPT.
Second, market rivalry measures the degree to which a firm is exposed to the
competitors or product market proximity. As discussed in section 3, the measure
of market rivalry is correlated with firm-level exports across destinations, and
hence, correlate with firm-level export price. Therefore, reverse causality arises.
To alleviate this concern, we estimate the specification of equation (5) in two
alternative ways: (1) use lagged firm-level market rivalry, i.e., replace lnRivalryit
by lnRivalryi,t−1 and (2) replace firm-level measure of market rivalry by its mean
over time, i.e., replace lnRivalryit by lnRivalryi =
1
T
∑T
t=1 lnRialryit. The results
are reported in Table 7.
[Table 7 is to be here]
15Berman et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2015) construct bins of the TFP measures based on its
percentile.
16This is to avoid outliers bias in our estimated results.
16
Columns (1)-(2) report the lagged market rivalry results and columns (3)-(4)
show the mean market rivalry results. All results indicate that market rivalry tends
to increase firm-level ERPT (a negative sign on the interaction lnRER×lnRivalry
implies a smaller price adjustment in response to exchange rate fluctuations), no
matter what measure we use.
Third, China has changed its exchange rate system from the dollar peg system
into a managed floating exchange rate system “with reference to” a currency bas-
ket in 2005. The significant exchange rate regime switching of Chinese yuan could
systematically change the exchange rate structure between Chinese yuan and cur-
rencies, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar. This change increases uncertainties
associated with export, which might affect firm-level pricing strategy in countries
which are pegged to the U.S. dollar. In order to avoid contaminating our baseline
results by exports to these U.S. dollar-pegged countries, we drop all countries that
adopt the dollar peg system from our sample and re-estimate equation (5). In
addition, new entrants and exits might have different pricing strategies from con-
tinuing exporters (e.g. Hu et al., 2016; Tan et al., 2016), and hence their response
to exchange rate fluctuations could be different from continuing exporters. For
example, Tan and Zhao (2017) show that new exporters need to build their brand
reputation, which results in a more aggressive response to exchange rate fluctua-
tions. To alleviate this concern, we follow Li et al. (2015) to drop observations in
individual firms’ entry year and exit year.17 All results are reported in Table 8.
[Table 8 is to be here]
Columns (1)-(2) report the estimated results after dropping all countries that
adopt the dollar peg system. The results show that the coefficient on lnRER
significant increase relative to that in Table 3. This might reflect that the ex-
change rate fluctuates more in countries adopting floating exchange rate regime,
and hence, exporters absorb more exchange rate fluctuations to avoid being over-
whelmed by competitors in these countries with more exchange rate uncertainties.
17In this way, we also drop firms which only export 1 period and then exit.
17
Similar to the baseline results, the negative and statistically significant coefficient
of the interaction term lnRER × lnRivalry implies that market rivalry increases
firms’ ERPT to destinations. Columns (3)-(4) report the results after dropping
observations in firms’ entry and exit years. Compared with the baseline results,
real exchange rate movements have a similar effect on firm-level export price, but
market rivalry increases firm-level ERPT to a higher degree (-0.0010 vs. -0.0006).
At the 80th percentile of the market rivalry measure (market rivalry=5.986), a firm
increases the export price by 0.06% less in response to a 10% domestic currency
depreciation.
Fourth, firm-level heterogeneities could result in firms’ heterogeneous ERPT.
For example, firms with higher productivity and higher market share tend to have
a lower ERPT (Amiti et al., 2014; Berman et al., 2012; Li et al., 2015). We add
more controls to alleviate the concern that our baseline results suffer from missing
variable issue. All results are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 is to be here]
In column (1), we add an interaction of log real exchange rate and log TFP
(lnRER×lnTFP ) to control for the heterogeneous response of firms with different
productivity to exchange rate movements; column (2) adds an interaction of log
real exchange rate and log GDP per capital in the destination countries (lnRER×
lnGDPPC). This is to control for different ERPT across different destinations;
column (3) adds an interaction of log real exchange rate and log market share
((lnRER× lnShare) to control for the impact of market share on firm-level export
price.18 Finally, in column (4) we include firm-level average import price to control
for the impact of import price on firms’ export price.19 Our results indicate that,
18Market rivalry affects firm-level ERPT to a particular country through the competition in
country j and other countries. After controlling for firm-level market share in country j, we
explore the impact cross-market competition spillovers on firm-level ERPT.
19We follow Amiti et al. (2014) to construct firm i’s average import price as: import priceit =∑
k
∑
j ωkjtlnpkjt, where lnpkjt denotes the import price of intermediate input k from country j
in year t, and ωkjt is a weight, which is computed as the revenue ratio of imported intermediate
k from j to all inputs.
18
after control for different firm-level or destination heterogeneities, the coefficient
on lnRER × lnRivalry is still negative and statistically significant. This implies
that higher degree of market rivalry a firm faces, the higher ERPT the firm passes
to export destinations.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate how the degree of market rivalry affects firms’ export
price and hence the firm-level ERPT. Our results demonstrate that firms that face
a higher degree of market rivalry (high level of product market proximity) are less
responsive to exchange rate fluctuations, which leads to a higher ERPT.
We further explore the possible mechanisms through which market rivalry affect
firm-level export pricing strategy. Results show that firms that export consump-
tion and heterogeneous products and to developed countries take into account
of market rivalry when adjusting their export price in response to exchange rate
fluctuations. In contrast, the export price of firms that export non-consumption
products and homogeneous products and to developing countries is insignificantly
affected by market rivalry. This implies that exporters are more concerned about
their competitors (high market rivalry or product market proximity) when (1)
buyers are more likely to switching their purchase (consumption products against
non-consumption products), (2) the degree of product heterogeneity is high, which
makes the leaked information more useful to competitors (heterogeneous products
against homogeneous products), (3) competitors can better make use of leaked
information and reputation spillovers (competitors in developed countries against
competitors in developing countries).
We conduct a series of robustness checks. All results confirm that market
rivalry is an important determinant factor in firm-level export price. When firms
export, especially to multiple markets, their export price in a particular destination
19
is affected by the competition in other destinations.20 Therefore, we conclude that
cross market competition is a key component which shapes firm-level ERPT.
20Recall that market rivalry is a measure of the degree of competition in all export destinations.
20
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Figure 3: The Time Trend of the Market Rivalry Measure
Table 1: The Matched Sample during 2000-2007
Annual Surveys Data Customs Data Matched Data
Year Num of Firms Num of Exporters Num of Exporters Num of Exporters
2000 121,722 32,947 62,771 11,360
2001 132,066 36,637 68,487 13,701
2002 144,157 41,163 78,612 16,292
2003 162,838 47,267 95,688 19,955
2004 234,618 71,347 120,590 28,626
2005 23,594 70,874 144,030 31,388
2006 261,472 74,627 171,205 34,425
2007 298,992 759,530 193,567 46,604
Notes: Data Source: authors own calculation based on the original datasets and the matched dataset.
28
Table 2: The descriptive statistics of the sample
Panel A: Customs Data
Export
Firms Countries Products Value
Total 241,709 240 4,546 369,123
Average 97,904 227 4,359 46,140
Panel B: Merged with ASPI
Export
Firms Countries Products Value
Total 72,811 237 4,415 209,627
Average 33,036 222 3,957 26,203
Panel C: Merged with IFS
Export
Firms Countries Products Value
Total 67,812 175 4,266 113,336
Average 30,365 173 3,790 14,167
Notes: Data Source: authors own calculation based on three datasets. Note: (1)When calculating the total
number of firms, countries and export products, we combined the data over years, and only count each variable
once when it first time appears. When calculating the average variables, we average them over years. (2) the unit
of the traded value is billion.
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Table 3: Market Rivalry Measure Variation across Export Sectors
Panel A: Top 10 competitive export sectors
HS6 Export Sector Market Rivalry (log)
640230 Other footwear, incorporating a protective 6.845
metal toe-cap
851910 Coin or disc-operated recorded-players 6.797
640330 Footwear made on a base or platform of wood, 6.741
not having an inner sole or a protective metal toe-ca
852190 Video recording or reproducing apparatus, 6.739
whether or not incorporating a video tuner - Other
611030 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar articles, 6.516
knitted or crocheted.- Of man-made fibres
420212 satchels, spectacle cases, – With outer surface of plastics 6.489
or of textile materials
852713 Other apparatus combined with sound recording 6.438
or reproducing apparatus
620462 Women’s or girls’ suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, 6.411
skirts, divided skirts, trousers, – Of cotton
420310 Articles of apparel 6.333
611020 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar 6.328
articles, knitted or crocheted.- Of cotton
Panel A: Bottom 10 competitive export sectors
284120 Chromates of zinc or of lead 0.001
450110 Natural cork, raw or simply prepared Printing machinery 0.012
used for printing by means of the printing type,
844312 blocks, plates, cylinders and ot –Sheet fed, 0.017
office type (sheet size not exceeding 22 x 36 cm)
261390 Molybdenum ores and concentrates - Other 0.025
401130 New pneumatic tyres, of rubber 0.025
- Of a kind used on aircraft
844090 Book- Binding machinery, including book-sewing machines 0.032
- Parts Photocopying apparatus incorporating
an optical system or of the contact
900911 type and thermo-copying app– Operating by reproducing 0.033
the original image directly onto the copy (direct process)
847220 Addressing machines and address plate embossing machines 0.038
870331 Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally 0.047
designed for the transport of persons – Of a cylinder capacity
not exceeding 1,500 cc
330113 Essential oils (terpeneless or not), including 0.047
concretes and absolutes; resinoids; extracted oleores– Of lemon
Notes: We have excluded export sectors where the number of export firms is fewer than 10. These sectors tend
to have a 0 degree of market rivalry measure. 30
Table 4: The Impact of Market Rivalry on Firms’ Export Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnRER 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0063)
lnRER× lnRivalry −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
lnRivalry −0.0354∗∗∗ −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0233∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
lnTFP 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007)
lnWage 0.2725∗∗∗ 0.2724∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015)
lnGDP 0.1657∗∗∗
(0.0170)
Prod-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3,504,827 3,504,827 3,504,827 3,504,827
R2 0.594 0.595 0.604 0.604
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The standard error in the
parenthesis.
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Table 7: Different Market Rivalry Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnRER 0.0678∗∗∗ 0.0727∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0064) (0.0063)
lnRER× lnRivalry −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
lnRivalry −0.0470∗∗∗ −0.0331∗∗∗ −0.0608∗∗∗ −0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
lnTFP 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0007)
lnWage 0.2960∗∗∗ 0.2691∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0015)
lnGDP 0.1986∗∗∗ 0.1658∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0170)
Prod-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1,496,197 1,496,197 3,504,827 3,504,827
R2 0.605 0.615 0.597 0.604
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The standard error in the
parenthesis.
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Table 8: Different Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnRER 0.1678∗∗∗ 0.1449∗∗∗ 0.0530∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0103) (0.0102)
lnRER× lnRivalry −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
lnRivalry −0.0368∗∗∗ −0.0249∗∗∗ −0.0378∗∗∗ −0.0248∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
lnTFP 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010)
lnWage 0.2721∗∗∗ 0.3123∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0021)
lnGDP 0.1153∗∗∗ 0.2365∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0267)
Prod-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,987,970 2,987,970 2,060,290 2,060,290
R2 0.595 0.603 0.593 0.603
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The standard error in the
parenthesis.
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Table 9: The Impact of Market Rivalry on Firms’ Export Price-More Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnRER 0.0424∗∗∗ 0.1711∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0694∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0208) (0.0063) (0.0079)
lnRER× lnRivalry −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
lnRivalry −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0233∗∗∗ −0.0228∗∗∗ −0.0235∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
lnTFP 0.0765∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009)
lnWage 0.2724∗∗∗ 0.2724∗∗∗ 0.2720∗∗∗ 0.2978∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018)
lnGDP 0.1692∗∗∗ 0.1212∗∗∗ 0.1844∗∗∗ 0.1502∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0394) (0.0170) (0.0204)
lnRER× lnTFP 0.0024∗∗∗
(0.0003)
lnRER× lnGDPPC 0.0276∗∗∗
(0.0024)
lnRER× lnShare 0.0083∗∗∗
(0.0026)
Import Price 0.0695∗∗∗
(0.0026)
Prod-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3,502,374 3,502,374 3,502,374 3,502,374
R2 0.604 0.604 0.603 0.604
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The standard error in the
parenthesis.
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